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Abstract 
In research on authoritarian institutions, legislatures are portrayed as capable of resolving dilemmas 
between the leader and opposition members. Nevertheless, repeated interactions between a leader 
and their ruling coalition can lead to both contested dictatorships, in which institutions constrain 
the leader, and established dictatorships, in which the leader exercises near-complete control. To 
date, however, no one has examined the patterns by which powers vary across legislatures in 
different settings and over time. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project on legislative 
powers between 1900 and 2017, we conceptualize changes in the powers afforded to the national 
congress to characterize the development of regimes in either direction. The study expounds on 
the content of legislatures across regimes and the ways in which they change, encouraging scholars 
to further consider the relationship between regime dynamics and legislative institutionalization. 
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Introduction 
Given the prominence of legislatures around the world and their central place in the dynamics of 
nondemocratic rule, it is surprising that few have concentrated on the ways in which legislatures 
are empowered or disempowered. Even more surprising is the extent to which we lack basic studies 
that examine how the content of legislative powers differs across regimes. Cross-nationally, we 
know very little about how powerful legislatures actually are or what the process of legislative 
strengthening looks like. This represents a weakness of comparative legislative studies, particularly 
for understanding the role of institutions in sustaining nondemocracies and initiating 
democratization. This paper takes an important step in addressing this problem by elucidating on 
comparative differences in legislative powers across democracies and nondemocracies alike. 
Building on existing work by scholars to measure and compare legislative strength, we 
utilize cross-national data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2018) and 
offer a descriptive account of both the kinds of legislative powers that are observable across 
regimes and the ways in which they change. We seek to answer some basic questions that, though 
crucial to the literature, have yet to be explored: Do legislatures possess similar powers across the same 
regions and regime types? Are the differences between democracies and nondemocracies reflected in the powers of their 
respective legislatures? Our descriptive approach in answering these questions supports the goal of 
treating descriptive inference as an independent and complementary tool of political science 
research—one that aims to establish the validity of the data for empirically evaluating legislative 
strength in nondemocracies (Gerring 2012).   
Though descriptive, our analysis provides valuable findings regarding legislative powers 
across regimes and highlights the importance of conceptualizing legislative institutionalization. We 
show that when legislatures lose or accrue power, they do so incrementally rather than drastically. 
We demonstrate that the number of legislative powers is strongly correlated with electoral 
democracy but shows greater variation among less democratic countries. The cumulative number 
of powers is related to the types of powers that we observe, with less powerful legislatures first 
assuming basic parliamentary functions and acquiring ‘consultative’ powers. There are also notable 
regional differences, such as parliaments in Latin America trailing behind those in Western Europe 
and North America but exhibiting considerable strength relative to other parts of the world.  By 
exploring the interrelation of democraticness and legislative strength, we find patterns that 
conform to theoretical models in which interactions between the executive and the ruling coalition 
produce different types of nondemocracies.  
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Examining substantive differences in the content of legislative powers and the ways in 
which they change encourages scholars to more seriously consider using information about 
legislative powers to evaluate the relationship between legislative institutionalization and 
nondemocratic performance. In depicting cross-national differences in legislative powers, our 
analysis exemplifies ways of using newly released data to build upon approaches that measured 
legislative strength as an index of powers (Chernykh et al. 2017, Fish and Kroenig 2009).  We also 
evaluate the data against multiple different measures of democracy, both continuous and 
dichotomous, to demonstrate its validity across measures.  In the following sections, we summarize 
extant research on the topic of legislatures in nondemocratic regimes. We then outline our 
approach to depicting legislative powers and present descriptive findings that offer guidance for 
future research that accounts for comparative differences in legislatures. By paying greater 
attention to the substance of legislatures as well as the ways in which they change over time, we 
argue that research on the institutions that undergird regimes can get a better grasp on explaining 
outcomes that result from them. 
I. Comparing legislatures across regimes 
Despite its close ties to democratic practices, scholars note that parliaments are ubiquitous across 
all regimes. With the exception of the years that encompassed the major world wars, more than 
half of all countries had a legislature over the last century according to the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al. 2018a, b; Pemstein et al. 2018). The proportion of countries 
with a legislature surpassed 0.75 in 1950 and 0.9 in 1990; today, virtually every country in the world 
is listed as having a legislature (Figure B-1 in Appendix B). This trend has motivated scholars to 
explain why legislatures have been so widely adopted by durable authoritarian regimes. Once 
dismissed as a mere façade—a rubber stamp giving the appearance of legitimacy to the ruler’s 
decisions—research has now shown that legislatures are, in fact, important pillars of stability in 
authoritarian regimes (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; 
Jensen et al. 2014; Truex 2014; Wright 2008). The formalization of opposition in authoritarian 
regimes—their inclusion in formal political institutions—is also associated with a variety of 
‘positive’ outcomes, such as increased regime longevity, a decreased risk of conflict, and greater 
investment (Fjelde 2010; Fjelde and de Soysa 2009; Weeks 2008; Wright 2008; Wright and Escribá-
Folch 2012). The emerging picture from this research underscores the claim that rather than being 
“less-perfect versions of their democratic counterparts...under dictatorship, nominally democratic 
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institutions serve quintessentially authoritarian ends” (Svolik 2012, p. 13). In other words, dictators 
do not survive in spite of parliaments but because of them. 
While our understanding about the purpose of the legislature in authoritarian settings has 
certainly improved, scholars have yet to explore the ways the strength of the legislature changes 
varies across regimes and across time. Consider, for example, Venezuela's President Nicolas 
Maduro. Amid an economic crisis, the opposition in the National Assembly initiated a referendum 
in 2016 to impeach him. Maduro responded to the threat not only by shutting down the National 
Assembly, but also by calling for an overhaul to the constitution to allow him to circumvent the 
National Assembly on a permanent basis.1 Instances like these highlight the often fragile 
environment in which parliaments and executives coexist. Parliaments may very well serve 
important functions in authoritarian regimes, but the powers they possess make them a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, the legislature offers an institutional solution to temporary regime 
threats, enabling the leader to co-opt opponents and diminish their destructive potential. On the 
other hand, more powerful legislatures are better able to constrain the ruler’s decision-making.  If 
the opposition gains control of such a legislature, they can successfully leverage that institutional 
power to marginalize, and perhaps even remove, the leader.  As a result, the leader has an incentive 
to maintain a legislature, albeit one with limited power. 
Absent other formal institutions, the strength of the legislature is an important indicator 
of the power asymmetry that characterizes the relationship between the leader and critical actors. 
This is especially so for the past, in which party cohesion and interparty competition were 
historically low. Understanding the relationship between executive and legislative power—what 
legislatures can do and the ways in which it is reinforced or undermined—is thus valuable for 
explaining differences in regimes and political outcomes, particularly where other institutions are 
not fully developed. For this reason, we exploit the variation in the powers attributed to legislatures 
to characterize their strength across regimes, with the aim of supporting research that could explain 
this variation. 
As Judge (2003) pointed out, “other than in agreeing that institutionalization is a process 
whereby legislatures develop discrete modes of internal organization which help to differentiate 
them from their political environment, there is little agreement as to exactly what its defining core 
                                               
1 Emily Tamkin. “Venezuela’s Supreme Court Shuts Down Country’s Congress.” Foreign Policy. March 30, 2017. 
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characteristics are” (pg. 499). While institutionalization has been conceptualized in a number of 
ways—including increasing adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence (Huntington 
1968)—our use of the term refers to the process by which legislatures acquire value as a result of 
taking on additional roles and responsibilities and becoming more autonomous. To that end, we 
are primarily interested in using information on legislative capabilities and autonomy to indicate 
greater institutional capacity and complexity through expanded functions. We argue that changes 
in the powers of the legislature, both nominal and observed, provide an informative gauge of 
parliamentary strength vis-à-vis the executive.  
Prior work 
The nature of executive-legislative relationships represents a major agenda in the study of 
comparative politics, but only a few studies have attempted to develop comparable measures of 
legislative strength. Though scholars lamented as late as 2012 that “[c]omparative legislative studies 
are often comparative in name only” (Desposato 2012, pg. 389), there are several notable 
exceptions. Fish and Kroenig (2009) used a large number of expert surveys in tandem with other 
data collection efforts to identify 32 attributes of national legislatures in 2007. The binary indicators 
that they used to construct the Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) were based on questions that 
concerned four concept areas: influence over the executive, institutional autonomy, specified 
powers, and institutional capacity. Their approach to measuring the strength of national legislatures 
was unprecedented and for the first time opened up the possibility of comparing parliaments 
across countries based on multiple powers. The information that the project yielded was only 
available for 2007, however, limiting the range over which national legislatures could be compared 
and forestalling its use to study change over time. 
An alternative project that also collected cross-national data on legislative abilities is the 
Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP), which documented codified rules regarding formal 
political institutions for countries between 1960 and 2012 (Wig et al. 2015).  Like Fish and Kroenig 
(2009), IAEP denoted qualities such as whether legislatures had the power to amend the 
constitution, executive veto power and the power to dissolve the legislature, and requirements of 
congressional approval for war and international treaties. A major distinction between the two is 
that IAEP focused exclusively on de jure rules, meaning whether powers were stipulated by law, 
whereas Fish and Kroenig (2009) also compared experts’ subjective assessments regarding specific 
powers. The trade-off involved combining legal mandates with hypothetical outcomes—if the 
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executive engaged in unconstitutional action, could the legislature prevent it? —as opposed to interpreting 
legislative strength based on documents that may or may not reflect reality. 
Improvements on the efforts of the aforementioned projects occurred with the creation 
of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, on which contributors from both of the previous 
projects collaborated. Based on a similar approach to that used by Fish and Kroenig (2009), V-
Dem amassed survey responses from over 3,000 country experts to produce a large number of 
disaggregated estimates of components of democracy for nearly every country in the world 
between 1900 and 2017 (Coppedge et al. 2018a, b; Pemstein et al. 2018). Constructing the dataset 
involved administering questions to country experts regarding specific rules and practices and 
using Bayesian item response modelling to derive reliable estimates, which are provided on both 
continuous and ordinal/dichotomous scales. The dataset includes detailed information on 
attributes regarding elections, parties, the executive, the legislature and judiciary, and civil society, 
as well as indicators of their strength and autonomy. 
Research design 
Building on the foundational data collection efforts of Fish and Kroenig (2009) and IAEP—in 
combination with insightful critiques offered by scholars such as Desposato (2012) and Chernykh 
et al. (2017) and the extensions provided by the V-Dem Project—, we utilized information on de 
facto and de jure powers attributed to the legislature to gauge its strength relative to the executive.  
Our focus on both legally mandated and expected powers stems from the recognition that not all 
constitutions are explicit in the enumeration of legislative powers and that the limits of the 
parliament can grow to exceed that conferred upon them on parchment. Expanding to include 
information on expected powers enables us to better differentiate among less democratic regimes, 
in which constitutional provisions do not necessarily reflect the balance of power between the 
executive and the legislature. At the same time, however, the stipulation of legislative powers on 
paper can still send a valuable signal in the evolving balance of power between a leader and her 
opponents (Albertus and Menaldo 2012). 
The V-Dem data denote several critical functions of the legislature through a series of 
questions that pertain to constitutionally mandated powers as well as their expected enforcement 
capacity, all of which were determined by expert coders. The exact wording of the questions that 
we considered for inclusion are provided from the codebook in Appendix A.  For transparency, 
and to facilitate replication, we also provided a table in Appendix B (Table B-1) that shows how 
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the powers that we selected correspond to those included in the PPI.2 The first set of powers 
concerns legally codified consultative powers. We noted whether the legislature is able to 
unilaterally amend the constitution and grant pardons, and whether legislative approval is legally 
required to ratify foreign treaties or declare war. We also included whether the legislature has the 
ability to introduce bills in all policy areas and if its approval is required to pass legislation.  
In addition to powers granted by law, we also considered questions related to the 
enforcement power of the legislature. These include whether the legislature regularly questions 
members of the executive branch and the likelihood that the legislature could conduct an 
independent investigation of the executive. To dichotomize the question of whether the legislature 
could investigate the executive, we coded a one if it were likely or nearly certain that the legislature 
would conduct an investigation against the executive if they were involved in unconstitutional 
activity, and zero otherwise. We also noted whether the legislature controls the necessary resources 
to finance internal operations in practice.  
As additional indicators of the strength of the legislature relative to the executive, we 
included several questions that assessed the leader’s relation to parliament. First, we noted whether 
the head of state was appointed or approved by the legislature. We also noted whether the 
legislature would likely succeed if it took steps to remove the head of state from office.  Roughly 
60 percent of observations in which the IAEP coded the legislature as having the legal power to 
dismiss the executive were considered likely to succeed in practice.  We added to this whether the 
head of state would not be likely to succeed in either dissolving the legislature or vetoing legislation, 
and whether they did not have the power to propose legislation.  Compared to measures from the 
IAEP, about 86 percent of observations in which the executive had the legal power to dissolve the 
legislature were coded by experts as likely to succeed.  Likewise, around 85 and 83 percent of the 
observations in which IAEP coded the executive as having the legal power to propose and veto 
legislation were observed or considered likely to succeed in practice based on V-Dem measures. 
In total, the sixteen indicators that we identified to gauge the ability of the executive to 
interfere with legislative activity and its power to create law and check the executive—six ‘by law’ 
and ten ‘by practice’—correspond to 12 of those used to construct the PPI.  This includes three 
variables relating to influence over the executive, four features of institutional autonomy, and five 
                                               
2 All items prefixed with ‘B’ (e.g. Table B-1) are provided in Appendix B. 
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specified powers.  Nine of these are in the top half of variables that were considered more 
important features by experts surveyed by Chernykh et al. (2017).  Of the 32 variables that 
composed the Parliamentary Powers Index, 12 were either not explicitly coded by V-Dem or were 
not easily identifiable.  We also included five variables that were not directly part of the PPI—
whether the legislature legislates in practice or by law; whether the legislature appoints the head of 
state; if the head of state can propose legislation; and if opposition parties exert oversight and 
investigative power.  For opposition oversight, we only coded it as one if experts’ responses to 
whether opposition parties exercise oversight and investigatory functions were “Yes, for the most 
part.” We converted all of the indicators to binary variables out of a foremost concern with 
whether a particular power was likely to hold or existed rather than qualifications of how likely it 
was to occur. 
There are a number of features that are vital for the functioning of the legislature that we 
did not account for.  Nevertheless, information on those characteristics is available in the V-Dem 
dataset and ought to be considered in analyses that employ estimates of legislative strength.  This 
includes eight of the variables that were originally part of the PPI.  First, we purposefully omitted 
the relationship between the legislature and the cabinet; we did not count whether legislators could 
serve as ministers in the government, nor whether their approval was required to appoint (or 
dismiss) ministers.  This decision was guided in part by a desire to minimize the impact of 
constitutional design; in 98 percent of parliamentary democracies, for example, the head of state 
either cannot appoint cabinet ministers or does so only with legislative approval, compared to 16 
percent of presidential democracies.  
In focusing on the relationship between the legislature and the head of state, we also 
excluded indicators of its relationship to other actors.  We did not include variables denoting the 
legislature’s power relative to the head of government—often appointed by the head of state, who 
is nominally more powerful—, nor whether the laws passed by the legislature were subject to 
judicial review.  Likewise, we did not indicate whether alternative bodies, such as a comptroller 
general, had the capacity to question and investigate the executive.  Excluding questions about 
outside actors is crucial for making comparisons across nondemocratic regimes, in which the lack 
of other autonomous institutions could be confounded with legislative strength.  This is also true 
regarding elections, which do not always occur with the same regularity in nondemocracies.  Other 
factors may influence legislative capacity but are further removed and less certain in 
nondemocracies, such as party discipline and legislative cohesion, as well as methods of popular 
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participation that can supplant legislative decision-making (initiatives, plebiscites, and 
referendums).  We do not consider the exclusion of such information a ‘sin of omission’, but 
instead as driven by a focus on comparing one institution across different contexts (Desposato 
2012, Fish and Kroenig 2012). 
Our use of specific indicators to denote legislative strength across regimes takes heed of 
criticisms that scholars have raised regarding the PPI (Chernykh et al. 2017, Desposato 2012).3  We 
tried to be judicious in the attributes that we selected to examine, thereby avoiding an overly 
inclusive approach that mixes information that may only be marginally relevant (Desposato 2012).  
Using the V-Dem data also helps to alleviate scholars’ concern with respondent uncertainty, 
insofar as the dataset provides upper and lower bounds on the point estimates calculated based on 
intercoder disagreement and measurement error (Coppedge et al. 2018, Desposato 2012).  Though 
we focus on the primary estimates, we illustrate bounds for high and low estimates in subsequent 
tables and figures.  Scholars have also pointed out the potential weakness of treating legislative 
powers as being equally important (Chernykh et al. 2017, Desposato 2012).  This concern is most 
relevant when scholars employ an aggregate index based on powers in empirical analyses.  To this 
end, Chernykh et al. (2017) used a large-scale survey of political scientists to re-weight the powers 
that made up the PPI.  For our purposes, comparing the number of powers is intended only to 
summarize how many of the aforementioned attributes corresponded across intervals of time and 
democracy level.  Notwithstanding, the valuable exercise undertaken by Chernykh et al. (2017) 
offers guidance for scholars who want to use the questions in the V-Dem data to construct a 
similarly weighted index. 
Table B-2 provides summary statistics for each of the sixteen powers on which we focused.  
Figure B-1 also illustrates trends in the proportion of each power by year, highlighting the least 
common power (opposition oversight) and most common power (legislates in practice) in 1900.  
Despite variation in the amount of missing observations, all of the variables cover 181 countries 
between 1900 and 2017.  The recently added Historical V-Dem data extended many indicators as 
far back as 1789, but the dataset is substantially more complete for the period after 1900.  For 
years before 1900, an average of 24 countries were covered, while roughly 101 countries are 
                                               
3 For a response to Desposato (2012), see Fish and Kroenig (2012). 
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represented annually in the post-1900 data. All of the information that we report thus refers to the 
period 1900-2017. 
Figure 1 also provides summary information by showing the frequency of each legislative 
power in our sample. The mean and median number of observations for which we have 
information on each legislative power is 14,788 and 13,415, respectively.  The most commonly 
observed powers are legislation by the parliament in practice and by law, followed by the ability to 
introduce bills and approve treaties. The cumulative number of powers is fairly normally 
distributed, with a mean of 7.6 and median value of 8 powers (Figure B-2).  Thus, the sample is 
not clearly differentiable into more and less democratic regimes, resembling a bimodal distribution.  
The overall number of powers based on low and high estimates are also normally distributed, with 
respective means of 7.4 and 7.8 and a mode of 8. 
  
Figure 1. Frequencies of individual powers in the sample  
In the following section, we examine legislative powers across all regimes. First, we look 
at country examples and regional differences in the proportion of powers that have been observed. 
We then focus on the relationship between types of powers and the overall number of powers, 
highlighting potential contingencies. We also look at how legislative powers vary across the level 
of democracy and elucidate on the manner in which they change over time.  Such a comparison 
promises to add flesh to models of legislative dynamics by describing both the extent to which 
legislatures differ and the speed with which they change. 
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II. Results 
Regional comparisons and examples 
Figure 2 illustrates how regions differ with regard to the proportion of observations in which each 
type of power has occurred since 1900.  Notably, there is no region that outperforms others on 
every question.  As expected, countries in Western Europe and North America exhibit substantially 
more equipped parliaments in terms of de jure powers and an anticipated ability to monitor and 
sanction the executive, especially with regard to the powers to introduce bills, control internal 
resources, and question the executive.  In contrast, a greater proportion of legislatures in Latin 
America have required legislative approval for war and treaties and have been able to grant 
amnesties. Although the region lags behind ‘Western’ powers in terms of the legislature’s ability to 
control resources and exert oversight functions—including investigating and questioning the 
executive—it surpasses other world regions on these dimensions.  Countries in Eastern Europe 
are comparatively weaker relative to Latin America, particularly with regard to monitoring and 
enforcing the actions of the executive.  The distribution of observations in the Middle East and 
North Africa most closely resembles that of Sub-Saharan Africa—not simply in the relative 
weakness of the legislature, but also in the frequencies of each power. In South and East Asia, 
more legislatures are able to introduce bills and amend the constitution compared to other 
developing regions, despite having relatively little opposition oversight. 
The distribution of legislative powers across regions is consistent with regime patterns and 
corroborate what existing scholarship has noted. Western Europe and North America show the 
most equipped legislatures, which have a longer history of parliamentary rule.  They are followed 
by Latin America, which is characterized by presidential democracy but has been subject to strong 
executives and repeated military intervention.  Eastern Europe and many countries in Asia, in 
contrast, have had legislatures that tended to be dominated by one-party rule.  Likewise, legislatures 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have been undermined by personalist regimes, while the Middle East has 
seen a mix of ‘strongman’ regimes like that of Saddam Hussain alongside durable monarchies 
found in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.  These differences are reflected in the prevalence of 
powers that are observable in each region. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of legislative powers by region 
In addition to depicting cross-regional differences, the data on legislative powers show 
temporal variation within countries that testify to their face validity.  Figure 3 shows two cases that 
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were chosen because they exemplify extreme variations associated with nondemocratic rule and 
democratization, both within and across regimes.  Brazil illustrates two ways in which military rule 
undermined legislative strength.  Following a defeat in the 1930 presidential elections, Governor 
of Rio Grande do Sul Getúlio Vargas participated in an insurrection supported by the military.  
The coup that placed him in office launched roughly 15 years of dictatorship, during most of which 
the legislature was abolished.  After overthrowing Vargas in 1945, the armed forces once again 
intervened in politics by replacing João Goulart in 1964.  The military remained in power for the 
next two decades; instead of abolishing the legislature, however, it increasingly restricted its power 
through a series of decrees known as the Institutional Acts.  Upon returning to the barracks in 
1985, a new constitution was promulgated in 1988 and the first legislative elections were held in 
1990, inaugurating a legislature with greater powers relative to the executive.   
As one of the few successes—indeed, the origin—of the ‘Arab Spring’ that began in late 
2010, Tunisia is also an exemplary case.  Following independence in 1956, the first legislative 
elections held after the new constitution occurred in 1959.  As was true for the Constituent 
Assembly, the party of President Habib Bourguiba won all of the seats.  Bourguiba remained head 
of state for over 30 years and was only replaced after being declared mentally unfit and removed 
from office by Prime Minister Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali.  In turn, Ben Ali continued in office as 
president for roughly 24 years, continuously being elected with large majorities until the large-scale 
uprising that unseated him in 2011.  Unlike other MENA countries that were subject to widespread 
protests at the time, the political regime change that occurred resulted in democratization and 
corresponded with the emergence of a substantially stronger legislature in terms of the powers that 
we identified. 
 
Figure 3. Illustrative examples: Brazil (1900-2017) and Tunisia (1959-2017) 
 
15 
Legislative powers and level of democracy 
Insofar as legislative strength is considered a key institutional feature of democratization (Dryzek 
2009, Fish 2006), important questions are whether more democratic countries correspond with 
more empowered legislatures and how powers attributed to the legislature vary across levels of 
democracy.  Figure 4 shows the relationship between the number of powers a legislature possesses 
and V-Dem’s measure of electoral democracy (v2x polyarchy).  None of the legislative powers 
feature directly in the construction of the electoral democracy index (EDI)—and different coders 
responded to specific sets of questions in the data—, thereby allowing us to compare the 
relationship between legislative strength and other aspects of democracy.  As the figure shows, 
there is a fairly strong positive correlation between the level of electoral democracy and the 
strength of the legislature.  Indeed, no legislature possesses fewer than five of the sixteen powers 
in regimes with a democracy score above 0.6.  At the same time, the greatest amount of variation 
in the number of legislative powers occurs below the median and mean value of democracy (0.321 
and 0.413, respectively), which spans nearly the entire index.  The apparent relationship between 
democracy and legislative strength is not restricted to the EDI.  The number of powers shows a 
similar correlation with the polity score from the Polity IV project, which measures regime 
authority characteristics on a scale from -10 to 10, with 10 being the most democratic (Marshall et 
al. 2017). 
 
Figure 4. Correlation of number of legislative powers with EDI and polity score  
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The findings also appear robust when we move from continuous to categorical regime type 
measures. Here, scholars have used a number of different approaches to distinguish democracies 
from less democratic regimes. These include assigning regimes to discrete categories based on 
qualitative differences (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002), using a ‘minimal definition’ of 
democracy based on electoral practices (Cheibub et al. 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000), and creating 
cut-off values for indices of democracy (Epstein et al. 2006; Hegre et al. 2001). For the purpose at 
hand, none of these approaches allow us to differentiate across regimes without imposing specific 
assumptions about the power-arrangement between the executive and legislature. As an initial 
approach, therefore, we split the sample of observations into evenly divided quantiles and compare 
legislative powers across them. In so doing, we are able to compare more democratic with less 
democratic regimes while leaving the characteristics of their respective legislature unspecified.  
When we divide the sample between two and five quantiles based on the electoral 
democracy index and plot the distribution of legislative powers for each, three quantiles appear to 
be the most distinct (shown in Figure 5).4 Going from two to three quantiles produces a ‘middle’ 
category situated fairly evenly between the countries with more institutionalized and less 
institutionalized legislatures. In contrast, specifying four quantiles results in a distribution that 
overlaps considerably with the third (refer to Figure B-3). The way in which observations are 
distributed based on the number of legislative powers supports the idea that regimes can be 
characterized as belonging to one of three ‘types’: democracies with institutionalized legislatures, 
nondemocracies with no or noninstitutionalized legislatures, and mid-range regimes with weakly 
to moderately institutionalized legislatures. The average number of legislative powers associated 
with each of the three quantiles is 3.7, 6.3, and 9.9, respectively, increasing by roughly three as we 
move from the lowest to the highest quantile.  The distribution is strikingly similar when we 
evaluate the number of powers across three quantiles based on the polity score (Figure B-4), which 
average 5.4, 7.7, and 10.7. 
 
 
                                               
4 The values that separate the EDI into three evenly divided quantiles are 0.117 and 0.339. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of count of legislative powers (Showing three quantiles of the electoral democracy 
index) 
Our approach to creating subsets based on relative democraticness comports well with 
existing categorical measures of democracy. Cheibub et al. (2010), for example, take a strictly 
minimalist approach wherein democracies satisfy the following requirements—they hold elections 
in which the outcome is uncertain, executive turnover follows a similar procedure, and elections 
are regularly held.  Based on their coding scheme, we observe the average number of legislative 
powers to be 10.2 in democracies (Figure B-5). There is thus only a 0.3-point difference between 
the legislative powers found in our highest democracy quantile—democracies with 
institutionalized legislatures—and those defined by Cheibub et al (2010). The same 0.3-point 
difference in legislative powers persists when switching to the measure by Boix et al. (2013), who 
designate as democracies those in which the executive and legislature are freely elected and a 
majority of adult men has the right to vote.  Notably, the types of democracy identified by Cheibub 
et al. (2010)—parliamentary versus presidential regimes—do not differ much by the number of 
powers, averaging 10.6 and 9.4 respectively (Figure B-6).5 
                                               
5 The biggest differences between parliamentary and presidential regimes concern limits on executive power; a 
substantially higher proportion of heads of state cannot veto or propose legislation in parliamentary democracies, and 
the heads of state in presidential democracies tend to face greater challenges dissolving the legislature.  
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In comparison to their democratic counterparts, scholars argue that legislatures in 
authoritarian settings serve qualitatively different purposes. Rather than acting as a conduit for 
channelling citizen preferences through representatives, in authoritarian regimes the legislature is 
a forum that regulates the contention between the leader and ruling elites. In what Svolik (2009) 
terms established dictatorships, the leader is powerful enough that challenges to their rule are non-
threatening. Here, if the legislature is present at all, it largely serves as a signalling mechanism—
one where the leader offers minimal powers to elites for their cooperation.  By contrast, in contested 
dictatorships the ruling elite is sufficiently strong to hold the leader in check and thereby maintain 
a more even power-sharing arrangement, which is often evident in its institutions.  This is 
illustrated by the distribution of powers among party-based autocracies coded by Geddes et al. 
(2014). Such regimes possess an average of 6.6 legislative powers, a difference of only 0.3 from the 
middle quantile (Figure B-7).  This supports the notion that regimes in this group are closer to 
contested dictatorships, which exhibit institutions that are somewhat capable of constraining the 
dictator. 
We also find support for differentiating between contested and established autocracies 
when focusing on the content of the legislative powers across the three quantiles.  Figure 6 depicts 
differences in the types of legislative powers that are observable across the three quantiles by 
illustrating the proportion of observations with each of the powers. The figure also provides upper 
and lower bounds associated with the estimates. As the figure shows, legislatures in the lowest 
third of countries based on electoral democracy are considerably weaker. Among them, the most 
common attributes include the head of state being unlikely to succeed in dissolving them, 
legislating in practice, and the ability to introduce bills. This reflects the fledgling nature of 
legislatures in the least democratic countries—they assume the basic functions of legislating but 
have little real power and few constitutional protections. 
Among countries with middle-range values of electoral democracy, the most substantial 
increases occur in de facto legislation and the legal power to legislate and introduce bills, followed 
by the power to approve war and treaties. At the highest quantile of the electoral democracy index, 
control over funds and the power to investigate the executive become most prominent, followed 
by greater questioning and oversight capacity. Legislative strengthening across regimes is actually 
more pronounced for quantiles based on the polity index (Figure B-8), in which countries in the 
lowest quantile go from legislating in practice and by law and introducing bills to questioning the 
executive and controlling resources in the middle quantile.  The highest quantile of democracy 
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shows a greater propensity to investigate the executive and to exert opposition oversight.  The 
differences in proportions, then, demonstrate that legislatures in more democratic regimes show 
greater legislative activity and the ability to hold the executive accountable.  In the context of 
nondemocratic regimes, it suggests that contested dictatorships (i.e. quantile 2) contain more 
institutionalized legislatures than their established counterparts (i.e. quantile 1).  This is consistent 
with categorizations of regimes based on the EDI, which code all countries in the lowest two 
quantiles as nondemocracies (Lührmann et al. 2018). 
 
Figure 6: Legislative powers, by democracy quantile 
Temporal features of changes in legislative powers 
Given our findings on the relationship between ‘democraticness’, legislative institutionalization, 
and the types of powers with which they are endowed, it is also important to consider the rate at 
which legislatures become further equipped or disempowered. Inasmuch as a count of the powers 
ascribed to the legislature provides a measure of strength, what is the actual process by which it changes?  
Moreover, does the rate of change differ when legislatures accrue power as opposed when they lose it?  Figure 7 
represents the acquisition (right panel) and loss (left panel) of powers in form of a network, 
illustrating how much change there is likely to be in powers from one year to the next.
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Figure 7. Transitions in the number of legislative powers 
The nodes in Figure 7 represent the number of powers a legislature possessed at a given 
year, and the ties indicate transitions that occurred from one node to another in the sample. The 
thicker the link between any two nodes, the more frequently that transition occurred.  A link 
between the nodes one and ten, for example, represents a legislature that underwent drastic 
changes, one in which they transitioned from possessing just one power in a given year to 
possessing ten of the powers in the subsequent year. This example is not reflected in the results, 
however; not a single instance occurred in which a legislature made a leap from one to ten powers, 
or vice-versa. Instead, the figure shows a strong tendency towards incremental change. Out of a 
total of 1,230 cross-node transition instances, over 80 percent (987) involved a neighbouring node. 
Given the legislature’s current powers, if it changed it tended to acquire or lose just one power. 
This is particularly true for legislatures that became weaker—roughly 86 percent of downward 
movements involved a one-power change, compared to 76 percent of upward transitions.  
Moreover, larger changes are apparent in institutionalizing legislatures—such as jumps from 2 to 
10, or from 3 to 9 powers—which do not occur among those that were de-institutionalizing.  This 
supports the implication that legislatures strengthen faster than they become weaker. 
To evaluate the way in which dynamics differ across regimes, we constructed similar 
networks representing institutionalization and de-institutionalization based on a dichotomous 
measure of democracy as well as across quantiles of the electoral democracy index.  Figure B-9 
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shows the breakdown of upwards and downwards changes in the number of legislative powers for 
democracies and nondemocracies coded by Boix et al. (2013), for which there were more 
observations.  De-institutionalization in democracies appears more iterative than in 
nondemocracies.  Another interesting finding is that changes spanning multiple powers tend to 
centre around the average number of legislative powers in both types of regimes.   
Legislative institutionalization—in the form of increases in the number of powers—is also 
illustrated for each of the three quantiles in Figure 8.  Fewer transitions occurred in the lowest 
quantile of electoral democracy, but a greater proportion of increases occurred over one value 
(0.895). Nearly the same proportion of increases in the upper-two quantiles involved single-value 
increases (0.836 and 0.841).  Mid-range regimes thus exhibit greater activity in terms of legislative 
institutionalization, as well as a tendency towards larger increases, compared to the least democratic 
regimes. This emphasizes the importance of considering the role of legislative institutionalization 
in in contested authoritarian regimes, where it tends to be in greater flux. 
III. Discussion 
The prevalence of legislatures across regimes, in combination with the established work on political 
institutions in nondemocracies, implies that they can be more than window dressings. The clout 
that the legislature wields as an institution is also not static, accentuating the need to better 
understand how powerful they are and in what ways they are empowered. Moreover, the types of 
powers secured by the legislature may be meaningful, even if on paper (Albertus and Menaldo 
2012). The content of powers with which legislatures are imbued is not well known, however, 
making it difficult to describe exactly how executive-legislative relations affect regime dynamics, 
especially in nondemocratic regimes. This underscores the first contribution of this paper, which 
is to illustrate and describe the powers of legislatures across regimes. To yield insights into the 
content of legislatures, we examined differences in sixteen specific powers coded by the Varieties 
of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2018a, b; Pemstein et al. 2018). 
Leveraging expert assessments of constitutionally inscribed and inferred powers attributed 
to legislatures, we evaluated their frequencies across regimes. In doing so, we found considerable 
variation in the types of powers that we observed and illuminated several findings.  The differences 
between regions in the average level of legislative institutionalization and the proportion of specific 
powers is clear—Western Europe and North America have substantially stronger legislatures, but 
the strength of parliaments in Latin America also stands apart from other world regions.  There is 
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also a fairly strong correlation between the overall number of legislative powers and the level of 
democracy.  In particular, there is noticeable differentiation between regimes based on the number 
of legislative powers and the level of electoral democracy, which coalesce into groups that resemble 
consolidated authoritarianism, institutionalized authoritarian regimes, and democracies. We find 
similar patterns across alternative indices of democracy level as well as extant regime typologies, 
suggesting a dimension on which many different measures correspond (Cheibub et al. 2010; 
Geddes et al. 2014). It is thus remarkable that none of the previous efforts to typify 
nondemocracies based on institutions have included legislatures as a distinguishing feature (Wilson 
2014). 
Across quantiles of electoral democracy, the tenuous relationship between the legislature 
and the executive first becomes formalized, followed by the addition of enforcement powers and 
then oversight and investigative powers. Given that the types of powers that we observed differs 
by the overall number of powers and the aggregate count of legislative powers corresponds to the 
electoral democracy index, it follows that there are differences in the types of powers that exist 
across democracy level. Comparing changes in legislative powers across time also shows that such 
change is often incremental. Rather than occurring all at once, the accumulation of more powers 
tends to be piecemeal, reflecting the notion of bargaining between the executive and 
parliamentarians as well as institutional continuity.  The extent of changes in legislative powers 
among mid-range regimes, toward both institutionalization and de-institutionalization, also 
testifies to the need to pay greater attention to legislative powers in democratizing and ‘contested’ 
authoritarian regimes (Svolik 2009). 
Our approach to indicating ‘institutionalization’ combined information on both legal and 
implied capabilities and treated the set of powers that we examined as being equally relevant, which 
is a valid concern for analyses that utilize indices of legislative power (Chernykh et al. 2017, 
Desposato 2012).  The combination of critical approaches to index construction and estimates of 
uncertainty provided by the V-Dem data can help to improve empirical research on legislative 
institutionalization.  Our approach encourages advancements in the study of legislative 
institutionalization by overviewing the available data and demonstrating its applicability in less 
democratic regimes. This represents the second major contribution of this paper, which is to point 
to the possibility of using legislative powers to vastly expand the scope of research on executive-
legislative relations in institutionalized autocracies, which use legislatures to constrain opposition 
and mitigate threats to the regime. This could involve modelling legislative institutionalization as a 
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function of opposition gains and regime dynamics and using it to predict outcomes such as regime 
survival and conflict. Additional questions include the extent to which powers act as substitutes 
for other concessions, and their specific impacts on features such as accountability and corruption. 
By utilizing data on specific powers, comparative legislative scholars are in a better position to 
expound on differences across regimes and to explain their effects on subsequent developments. 
Conclusion 
Although scholars have argued that legislatures may serve functional roles in nondemocracies, 
there is little work that considers the types of power that authoritarian legislatures have. While the 
literature on authoritarian institutions contains explanations for the dynamics that seemingly give 
rise to new rules and practices, they are not substantiated by analyses that relate the type or number 
of powers wielded by the congress to their ability to check the executive and exert constraints. 
This paper elucidates on legislative strength across regimes by looking at differences in the types 
and number of powers associated with them. Based on data from the Varieties of Democracy 
Project for 181 countries between 1900 and 2017, we used dichotomous information on sixteen 
different powers to depict the ways in which regimes differ in terms of the types and number of 
legislative powers. 
Our comparative overview highlights several noteworthy findings.  First, we observe 
regional differences in the frequencies of specific legislative attributes, as well as temporal changes 
that appear to be face-valid descriptors of well-known cases.  Different ‘types’ of regimes are also 
distinguishable by the overall number of powers, across which the types of powers differ, and 
there is some evidence of order in the accumulation of powers attributed to the legislature.  We 
demonstrated that the cumulative number of legislative powers that we examined were strongly 
correlated with the level of electoral democracy and that the type of powers varies by both the 
overall number of powers and the level of democracy. In particular, splitting the sample into equal 
groups based on the level of electoral democracy shows that the least democratic regimes tend to 
be associated with legislatures that have only ‘consultative powers’, referring to the ability to 
approve treaties and war and to amend the constitution. Though they are unlikely to meet the 
minimal criteria to be considered democratic, a greater proportion of countries in the middle range 
of democraticness have legislatures that have increasing power to select and question the executive 
and to administer the funding of internal operations. Only in the most democratic group of 
countries are investigation and oversight powers observable among legislatures. 
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Analysing changes in legislative powers across time also revealed that such changes are 
slow and incremental, which supports models that portray legislatures as products of a bargaining 
process between the executive and coalition members. We argued that patterns of legislative 
institutionalization—in terms of the powers attributable to them—support theoretical accounts of 
such processes producing established and contested dictatorships, which is reflected in both the type 
and number of powers that we observed. Our descriptive analyses constitute a necessary part of 
the process of expanding the frontier of research objectives (Gerring 2012). By thinking more 
about the content as well as the structure that leaders use to form a support coalition and respond 
to outsiders, institutional scholarship can develop more precise explanations for the mechanisms 
that affect regime change and persistence. 
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Appendix A. List of questions 
Questions are shown as they are listed in Coppedge et al. (2018a), in the order in which they appear. 
 
3.4.4 HOS removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhsp, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell 
Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of 
state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful 
activity and without the involvement of any other agency? 
Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered 
to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether 
this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through 
an impeachment process. 
Responses: 
0: No, under no circumstances. 
1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.  
2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail. 
3: Yes, most likely. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.4.9 HOS dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdfdshs, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell 
Question: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to 
succeed? 
Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in 
practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or 
not. By ”dissolving the legislature” we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election 
for the legislature. 
Responses:  
0: No. 
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events 
(for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed 
attempts to form a cabinet). 
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as “once a 
year”, by time point within term, such as “not within the last sixth months of the head of state’s 
term”, and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election). 
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.4.11 HOS veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvths, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell 
Question: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to 
succeed? 
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Clarification: By “veto”, we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package 
vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question 
refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether 
this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. 
Responses:  
0: No. 
1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half 
of those voting). 
2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than 
half of the members of the legislature). 
3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-
majority — e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting). 
4: Yes, with no possibility of override. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.4.13 HOS proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphs, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell 
Question: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation? Clarification: By 
“propose legislation”, we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the 
head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law 
and whether this power has been exercised or not. 
Responses: 
0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other 
bodies may initiate bills). 
1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies. 
2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.5.8 Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v2lgqstexp, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials? Clarification: By 
“question” we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of 
government could be forced to explain its policies or testify. Responses: 
0: No — never or very rarely. 
1: Yes — routinely. 
Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 3-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.5.9 Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v2lginvstp, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it 
that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with 
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government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report 
that is unfavourable to the executive? 
Responses: 
0: Extremely unlikely. 
1: Unlikely. 
2: As likely as not.  
3: Likely. 
4: Certain or nearly certain. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.5.12 Legislature opposition parties (C) (v2lgoppart, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight 
and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition? 
Responses: 
0: No, not at all.  
1: Occasionally. 
2: Yes, for the most part. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.5.13 Legislature controls resources (C) (v2lgfunds, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal 
operations and the perquisites of its members? 
Responses: 
0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature’s operation depend 
on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 3-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.5.18 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegplo, * osp, * ord) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required 
to pass legislation? 
Responses: 
0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of 
the legislature. 
1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber 
of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed. 
2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) 
chamber of the legislature. 
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Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Data release: 1-8. 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model  
(see V-Dem Methodology). 
 
3.5.25 HOS appointed by legislature (D) (v2exlegconhos) 
Project Manager(s): Jan Teorell 
Question: Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature 
necessary for the appointment of the head of state? 
Responses:  
0: No. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Source(s): v2expathhs v2exaphos 
Data release: 5-8. 
 
3.5.26 Legislature amends constitution (B) (v2lgamend) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution 
without the involvement of any other body? 
Responses: 
0: No. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Data release: 1-8. 
 
3.5.27 Legislature amnesties (B) (v2lgamnsty) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon? 
Responses:  
0: No. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Data release: 1-8. 
 
3.5.33 Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintblo) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to 
introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions? 
Responses: 
0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Source(s): CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators. 
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for 
country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012). 
Data release: 1-8. 
 
3.5.35 Lower chamber legislates by law (B) (v2lglegllo) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
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Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to 
pass legislation? 
Responses: 
0: No. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Data release: 1-8. 
 
3.5.41 Legislature approval of treaties by law (A) (v2lgtreaty) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries? 
Responses:  
0: No. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Source(s): CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v492; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators. 
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for 
country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012). 
Data release: 1-8. 
 
3.5.44 Legislature declares war by law (A) (v2lgwarlaw) 
Project Manager(s): Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig 
Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to 
declare war? 
Responses:  
0: No. 
1: Yes. 
Scale: Dichotomous. 
Source(s): CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v488; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators. 
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for 
country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012). 
Data release: 6, 7. 
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Appendix B. Supplementary figures and tables 
Table B-1. Comparison to PPI components 
 
PPI component Summary V-Dem measure 
Replace exec Can remove president/prime minister v2exremhsp 
Serve min Legislators can serve as ministers (v2lgsrvlo) 
Interpellate Can summon executive officials v2lgqstexp 
Investigate Can conduct independent investigation v2lginvstp 
Oversee pol Oversight over agencies of coercion n/a 
Appoint pm Appoints the prime minister (v2ex_legconhog) 
Appoint min Approval required/appoints ministers (v2exdfcbhs) 
Lack pres No president or elected by legislature n/a 
No conf Can vote no confidence n/a 
No diss Immune from dissolution by executive v2exdfdshs 
No decree Executive lacks decree power n/a 
No veto Executive lacks effective veto power v2exdfvths 
No review Laws not subject to judicial review (v2jureview) 
No gate Can initiate bills in all policy areas v2lgintblo 
No impound Executive cannot impound funds n/a 
Cont resor Legislature controls internal funds v2lgfunds 
Immunity Legislators immune from prosecution (e_ccp_immunity)† 
Elected All legislators elected (v2lgello) 
Amend Can independently change constitution v2lgamend 
War Approval required to declare war v2lgwarlaw 
Treaty Approval required to ratify treaties v2lgtreaty 
Amnesty Can grant amnesty v2lgamnsty 
Pardon Can grant pardons v2lgamnsty 
Judiciary Reviews/appoints judicial members n/a 
Bank Appoints central bank chairman n/a 
Media Substantial voice in state-owned media n/a 
Sessions Is regularly in session n/a 
Secretary Each legislator has personal secretary n/a 
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Staff Each legislator has at least one staff (v2lgstafflo) 
No limit Legislators eligible for re-election (v2lgtrmlup) 
Seek reelect Legislators seek re-election n/a 
Experience Contains highly experienced members n/a 
 Legislates in practice v2lglegplo 
 Legislates by law v2lglegllo 
 Appoints head of state v2ex_legconhos 
 Head of state proposes legislation v2exdfpphs 
 Opposition oversight v2lgoppart 
†Available in V-Dem dataset but not created by V-Dem 
 
This table provides a comparison of the measures used to construct the Parliamentary Powers Index 
(Fish and Kroenig 2007) and related variables in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018), as well 
as additional measures examined in this paper.  Variables listed here refer to the lower chamber      
(if bicameral).  Variables in parentheses could be used to approximate the measure but were not 
examined in this paper, while n/a indicates that information is not available from the V-Dem data.  
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Table B-2. Summary statistics 
 
Power N lower bound mean upper bound 
amend constitution  13441 n/a 0.438 n/a 
appoint HOS  18311 n/a 0.204 n/a 
can remove HOS  18205 0.052 0.133 0.171 
control resources  13417 0.511 0.580 0.607 
grant amnesties  13573 n/a 0.363 n/a 
HOS cannot dissolve  18270 0.336 0.255 0.205 
HOS cannot propose  18279 0.185 0.211 0.237 
HOS cannot veto  18267 0.255 0.168 0.14 
introduce bills  13014 n/a 0.723 n/a 
investigate  13403 0.295 0.339 0.384 
legislates by law  12593 n/a 0.853 n/a 
legislates in practice  13413 0.881 0.924 0.948 
opposition oversight  13387 0.178 0.232 0.279 
question  13404 0.490 0.530 0.569 
treaty approval  12889 n/a 0.654 n/a 
war approval  12736 n/a 0.567 n/a 
Lower and upper bounds are estimates based on intercoder disagreement and 
measurement error.   
For more information, refer to Coppedge et al. (2018). 
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Figure B-1. Proportion of countries with legislature and legislative powers over time              
(highlighting the most and least common powers in 1900) 
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Figure B-2. Distribution of count of legislative powers (primary estimates) 
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Figure B-3. Distribution of count of legislative powers                                                             (Showing 
different quantiles based on the electoral democracy index) 
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Figure B-4. Distribution of count of legislative powers based on the polity index                       (Marshall 
et al. 2017) 
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Figure B-5. Distribution of count of legislative powers based on            
Cheibub et al. (2010) and Boix et al. (2013) 
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Figure B-6. Distribution of count of legislative powers by type of democracy and     
differences in proportion of powers observed, based on Cheibub et al. (2010) 
  
 
42 
 
Figure B-7. Distribution of count of legislative powers based on Geddes et al. (2014). 
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Figure B-8: Legislative powers by democracy quantile, based on the polity index                  (Marshall 
et al. 2017) 
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Figure B-9. Transitions in the number of legislative powers, based on Boix et al. (2013) 
